“The Police need to evolve and strengthen SOCMINT capabilities. A single, networked hub of excellence and a managed network of experts should coordinate SOCMINT development across different branches of the police,” recommends the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media (CASM), which is a collaboration between the Demos think tank and the Text Analytics Group at the University of Sussex.
The report published by Demos, unrelated to the US think tank of the same name, separates SOCMINT into four categories: open; directed covert surveillance; covert human intelligence; and intercept or intrusive covert surveillance.
Open SOCMINT involves the analysis of social media data where the user has no expectation of privacy and thus surveillance requires no superior authorization to remain within data protection laws. Analysis of tweets is open SOCMINT; surveillance of Twitter’s direct messages (DMs) is not. Open SOCMINT could be improved by big data analytics. “‘Listening’ to social media using powerful ‘big data’ acquisition and analytics tools can help the police spot emerging events, piece together networks and groups, discern public attitudes and improve situational awareness,” suggests the report.
It notes, however, that large-scale automated open SOCMINT analysis “might not command public confidence”, and should therefore be conducted “according to good ethical and professional research standards.”
The remaining three categories all need to be sanctioned within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), and need not be made public. Directed covert surveillance is covert but not intrusive, “ie, not taking place in a private residence, but is likely to result in the obtaining of private information.” An example could be the analysis of content that is technically open, but where the user might reasonably consider it private – such as a chat forum.
The third category, covert human intelligence sources known as CHIS, do not involve the use of intrusive surveillance but involve operatives disguising their true identity in order to gather intelligence. It is “the covert manipulation of a relationship to gain any information,” and requires authorization under RIPA.
The fourth category is intercept or intrusive covert surveillance. This is the interception of communication content while it is being transmitted. “Intrusive covert surveillance,” notes the report, “requires authorization from the Chief Constable with the approval of a Surveillance Commissioner, unless the case is urgent.”
Of course the report isn’t entirely about social media intelligence gathering. “Social media allows the police to engage and include the public in law enforcement in new, potentially transformative ways,” it says, frequently referring to the #shopalooter Twitter campaign following last year’s London riots. The problem, it adds, is that “it also makes these engagements more difficult to control, and open to misuse and reputational damage.”
It is for the combined purpose of engaging with law-abiding sections of the public while simultaneously gathering covert intelligence on lawless sections of the public that Demos/CASM recommends a central police hub for SOCMINT. “Establishing one central command for monitoring social media intelligence and encouraging local constabularies to use social media to work with law-abiding members of the community would go a long way to ensure officers are better equipped,” Jamie Bartless, director of CASM, told the Police Oracle publication.